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The defendant was 19 when she fatally stabbed her partner. She alleged the victim had 
been violent towards her during an argument, and had also deprecated her parents and 
referred to her in a derogatory manner when speaking on the telephone with a female 
friend earlier that evening. There was some evidence of the victim being violent towards 
the defendant on previous occasions, including police involvement, although witnesses 
gave evidence that there was violence by both parties, and it was the defendant who was 
in control of the relationship. *J. Crim. L. 351  Evidence was also given by the deceased's 
previous partner that he had been violent towards her and at one point, when he had 
cornered her; she too threatened him with a knife. 
The prosecution argued that the defendant had stabbed the deceased out of jealousy after 
finding him speaking to a female friend on the telephone. The defendant claimed she 
stabbed the victim in self-defence after he had tried to strangle her and thrown her against 
a wall. She claimed that she did not remember stabbing the victim, but on realising what 
had happened, she immediately called for help. There was some physical evidence that she 
had been injured, including marks to the neck consistent with her testimony, and the victim 
had nail marks to his face and neck. 
No defence of provocation was advanced, although the judge did give some instruction on 
the matter to the jury, including written directions, advising them that they must consider 
whether the defendant lost her self-control as a result of the comments the deceased made. 
There was no specific reference to considering the violence, past or present, merely that 
the jury should consider things said and done immediately before the killing and the nature 
and history of the relationship. 
The defendant was convicted of murder, and appealed alleging that the judge had informed 
the jury to consider only two narrow aspects of the evidence that was capable of amounting 
to provocation, and had failed to give adequate directions to the jury on the meaning of 
provocation and when it should apply. 
 HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND SUBSTITUTING A VERDICT OF 
MANSLAUGHTER, although the defence was not advanced by the defendant, there was 
evidence that raised the possible defence and the judge had a duty to introduce it, referring 
to the relevant evidence when directing the jury. As counsel refrained from commenting on 
provocation, the members of the jury had assistance from no other source; therefore they 
had only the judge's submission to base their decision on. The judge should have pointed 
out to the jury the relevance of the defendant's history, namely that she grew up in a 
culture of domestic violence, which may have been relevant to the gravity of the 
provocation, and that the issue of cumulative provocation should have been dealt with. 
With the judge giving such a narrow interpretation of the evidence, the jury may have 
thought the provocation defence had no strong support, leading them to reject the plea. 
COMMENTARY 
Under s. 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, the judge had a duty to leave the issue of provocation 
to the jury as long as there was evidence of it, no matter how trivial it may have been. This 
was confirmed in R v Rossiter [1994] 2 All ER 752, where Russell LJ referred to the jury 
being allowed to rule on provocation if there is any material capable of amounting to it, 
‘however tenuous it may be’. Certainly, this leaves scope for a perverse verdict by the jury. 
Not only was there a duty to leave the issue of provocation to the jury but, understandably, 
the judge was also obliged to indicate what evidence might support the defence, unless it 
is *J. Crim. L. 352  obvious (see R v Stewart [1995] 4 All ER 999). The Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 changes this doctrine, now putting the decision as to whether or not to 
leave the issue to the jury into the judge's hands (Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 54(6)). 
It is a matter of law, and therefore for the judge alone to decide, whether sufficient 
evidence has been presented to leave the partial defence of loss of control to the jury, 
rather than being obliged to address the matter where there is little prospect of it 
succeeding. In a sense this reverts the law to the position before the 1957 Act, where the 
judge was able to withdraw provocation if he thought the objective element was not 
satisfied, and possibly gives a safeguard against verdicts which most would consider to be 
lacking in fairness, logic and justice. The judge confronted his duty by suggesting the 
possibility of a verdict of manslaughter on grounds of provocation, even though the idea 
had not been introduced by counsel, but this needs to be accompanied by clear directions 
to the jury including which evidence is relevant. The defendant relied upon self-defence, 
and so it is unlikely counsel would also have introduced the idea of a partial defence to the 
jury, favouring an acquittal over conviction of a lesser offence, and knowing that it is likely 
the judge would direct the jury on the matter anyway. This may be a convenience no longer 
afforded now that the judge can decide whether to leave the issue of loss of control to the 
jury (Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 54(6)); it may be that counsel establishing grounds 
for the defence is counsel's solitary chance to convince the judge that sufficient evidence is 
present for such a direction. Coupling this lack of clarity with the omission by counsel to 
introduce the idea, information for the jury was lacking, hence the jury's subsequent 
dismissal of the defence. 
The issue of the relevance of the defendant's personal history is certainly noteworthy. 
Having grown up in an environment where domestic violence was frequent, this may have 
altered the defendant's perception of it, and therefore the gravity of the provocation. It has 
been well established that any such characteristics of the defendant which affect the 
severity of the provocative conduct may by attributed to the reasonable person when 
assessing the objective standard of the provocation test. This was the case in R v 
Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008, where an appeal succeeded on the basis that her 
abnormal immaturity and attention-seeking traits should have been attributed to the 
reasonable person. It is on the issue of powers of self-control that characteristics other 
than sex and age must be ignored, as discussed in R v Camplin [1978] AC 705. This was 
reaffirmed in Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23; [2005] 3 All ER 371, 
where the Privy Council's decision was that a uniform approach should be taken towards 
the objective string to the provocation bow. In this case, that would certainly include the 
jury considering their ‘reasonable person’ as a 19-year-old girl who grew up in a culture of 
domestic violence in regard to the gravity of the provocation, but not having regard to any 
effect it may have had on her powers of self-control. This principle has also been retained 
by s. 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, although it is worth mentioning that under 
the new law, the word ‘characteristics’ has *J. Crim. L. 353  been substituted for 
‘circumstances’, which may suggest an externalising of factors to be included rather than 
mere character traits. 
Merit was also given to the argument that the judge should have advised the jury that they 
may consider the effects of cumulative provocation on the defendant. This is a term most 
readily associated with ‘battered woman’ cases, where a defendant kills her abuser after 
years of suffering and a build up of several provocative incidents (see R v Ahluwalia [1992] 
4 All ER 889 and R v Thornton(No. 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023). The concern in such cases is 
often over any time lapse between the last provocative incident and the fatal incident, but 
the courts have, in the last two decades at least, been willing to accept that the subjective 
element can still be satisfied even when the reaction is delayed, as in Ahluwalia. This 
element is satisfied as long at there is a loss of self-control at the time of the fatal incident, 
and not merely an impairment of judgment (R v Ibrams (1984) 74 Cr App R 154) or a loss 
of self-restraint (R v Cocker [1989] Crim LR 740). There was previously a restriction to this 
loss of self-control, namely that it must be ‘sudden’, founded in the case of R v Duffy [1949] 
1 All ER 932, which had a large role to play in the lapse of time dilemma, but this has been 
removed by the 2009 Act and is no longer a factor to be considered (s. 54(2)). In the 
present case, during the most recent event, there was an altercation, combined with 
violent conduct, which lasted for a few minutes. The judge made clear to the jury that there 
was evidence of provocative conduct, although he did not refer to it in its entirety. The 
evidence of provocative conduct is in fact plentiful, and would have likely satisfied the 
conditions of the 2009 Act, at ss 54-56, which provides a partial defence replacing 
provocation where the defendant has lost self-control due one of two qualifying triggers; a 
fear of serious violence or due to circumstances of an extremely grave character which 
resulted in a justifiable sense of being wronged. What is more, like the case of Humphreys, 
it may well have satisfied both qualifying triggers, with a situation amounting to both a fear 
of violence and provocative acts of an extremely serious nature. 
The most thought-provoking aspect of this case is the issue of the deceased's previous 
partner giving evidence as to her experiences. She suffered from multiple sclerosis and was 
in a wheelchair. The deceased had cornered her, and on trying to escape she grabbed a 
knife and threatened him with it, although the incident ended with her dropping the knife 
and breaking down in tears. On appeal, it was submitted that the jury should have been 
 reminded of these facts, having regard in particular to the detail that she too had picked up 
a knife when so provoked by the deceased. In fact, on this issue, the judge had said in his 
summing-up that the jury should not judge her reaction against another's and use this 
comparison to set up a yardstick to measure how the defendant herself should have acted 
in the situation. This statement alone seems to be the judge suggesting that the evidence 
of another person acting in a very similar manner does not have relevance when assessing 
if a reasonable person would have acted in the same way as the defendant. This argument 
was also deemed to have no substance by Laws LJ in the present appeal. This seems 
somewhat strange; we strive *J. Crim. L. 354  to understand how best to put forward the 
concept of the reasonable person in the context of this partial defence, but are not willing 
to use evidence suggesting that another person in these circumstances reacted in a similar 
manner. Granted the deceased's previous partner did not carry through her threats, but 
her instinct was the same and her reaction to provocative conduct was the same--to pick 
up a knife. It may be arguable that these two women might not sit comfortably next to each 
other when we are building the ‘ordinary’ person, but if there were enough evidence 
present that the defendant had in fact lost her self-control, and there is proof that another 
woman reacted in a similar manner to threats and provocative conduct by the deceased, 
surely it could be suggested to the jury as establishing that the defendant did in fact act as 
any other reasonable person in her position might have? The judge asked the jury not to 
use this as a yardstick to measure the defendant's actions against, but that is exactly what 
the law is asking by having an objective standard in place; the defendant's actions are to be 
measured against the actions a reasonable person might have taken. Granted the 
deceased's previous partner is just one other person, and it is to be questioned whether 
she can be taken as an ordinary reasonable person, but she is the closest model likely to be 
found in assessing how someone else might have reacted in the given situation. It is 
interesting to compare the objective test applied in this case to that applied in India as 
regards provocation, where it is only necessary that the ordinary person would have lost 
his or her self-control, not that he or she would have done so and acted as the defendant 
did also (see Stanley Yeo's article, ‘Lessons on Provocation from the Indian Penal Code’ 
(1992) 41(3) ICLQ 615). It is incredibly difficult to ask something reasonable of someone 
deprived of the powers of self-control. Section 54(1)(c) of the 2009 Act uses the word 
‘might’ when considering how someone else in the same situation would have acted. This 
appears to be a much looser term than that used in s. 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, and this 
‘might/would’ distinction is hopefully a step in the right direction when it comes to 
assessing the actions of a person, once self-control has been lost. 
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